INTRODUCTION

While exports of French wine have faced great difficulties since the 2000’s, those referring to the varietals have met incredible success, especially those coming from the South of France. The Languedoc-Roussillon region, exporting more than 2 million hectoliters across the world in 2009, has exceeded the traditional Denomination of Origin (D.O.) wines from Bordeaux and the Côtes du Rhône. Undoubtedly, this success is partly ascribable to the immense resources of the regional vineyards, allowing it to position on this market. During last 40 years indeed, the plantation of varietals types of wines known as “international” (Syrah, Merlot, Sauvignon Cabernet, Chardonnay) rose in a fulgurating way. At the same time, firms have developed innovative models of production, communication, marketing to position on this market. At the international level, Languedoc-Roussillon has become the 5th biggest exporter of varietal wines in volume. At the national level, it dominates the market of the varietals wines, since 88% of those marketed in large and medium-sized retail business comes from the region of Languedoc-Roussillon. These few facts lead us to the following question: how has this category of wine met with such legitimacy today, when it did not even exist 25 years ago?

A general brief answer can be proposed, inspired from the economic sociology, which proposes to study the social construction of the markets. The economic sociologic perspective (FLIGSTEIN 1996, 2001a, 2001b; PODOLNY, 2005; GARCIA PARPET, 2004, 2009; LAFERTE, 2006) enables to suggest an explanation to our question, as follows: the appearance of the varietal wines results from a strategy carried out jointly by certain local firms, which managed to build hand-in-hand with the State the rules – and standard - framing the market for varietal wines, to their benefit. This assertion might seem obvious at first sight, but it remains difficult to date, and especially, it does not explain how such an evolution in the French wine environment was possible. However, several objective evidence invites us to propose such a reading: 1 - the initial creation of a private label “local wine of Pays d’Oc” for the varietal wines produces in Languedoc-Roussillon, resulting from the collaboration of local firms at the end of the Eighties (ATKIN, 1994; GARCIA-

2. See SCEES-INSEE, *Recensement agricole 1988. La viticulture française*, Etudes, n°4, juin 1990. Varietals of Merlot, Syrah and Cabernet-Sauvignon were not traditionally grown in Languedoc-Roussillon. In 1968, there were no more than 100 hectares of them planted.

PARPET, 2004) 2 – The creation of a trade union specific to the local wines of Occ. 3 – The recognition granted by the French State, which created by decree their rules of production and specific presentation. However, the bond between the micro - the construction of economic strategies and the formalization of local economic interests - and macro dimension - their institutionalization on the level of the State – is in no way obvious. Two disciplinary approaches at least have paid attention on this: connecting them - economic sociology and political science », providing nevertheless a promising complementarity (FRANCOIS, 2011). The first thus makes it possible to think the strategies of competition, the construction of economic interests starting from the local level on one side, the second makes it possible to seize the transformation of these private interests into policy issues and their institutionalization at the State level. A crossing of both is then likely to clarify the appearance of varietal wines in France.

Focusing on the social structuring of the markets, economic sociology pays a special attention to competition between sector actors, and takes into account the economic strategies, which they develop at a local level. It is on this local level that firms initially try to control their environment, the relationship with their partners and their competitors. In this competition process, each agent seeks to impose the manufacturing standards, which will ensure its legal and cultural domination on its adversaries. To dominate an incipient market requires more to impose standards of references than reference goods. With this intention, the firms develop a “conception of control” (FLIGSTEIN, 2002b), a vision of the market, relations and power struggles inside it. When actors recognize and adopt standards, they allow the firms, which have built them, to acquire a dominant position in the market, empowering them durably. The institutionalization of a “conception of control” by the State provides to the firm – or organization -, which built it, a competitive advantage locally and nationally. It obtains a legal framework, which organizes the exchanges of a product, the competition between the actors, guarantees to the firm a protection of its products and its production techniques. The firm, which initiated a specific “conception of control”, becomes a leading actor, an “incumbent” (FLIGSTEIN, 2001 c; 17) on the market that it contributed to create with the State. Their “conception of control” is binding their rivals, the “challengers”, who generally
try to imitate them. The case of the varietal wines in Languedoc-Roussillon has been recently observed (GARCIA-PARPET, 2004, 2009), but has remained however limited. According to it, the local emergence of this new type of wine finds a single explanation: a strategy of local actors bonded with international markets to import the concept of “varietal wine” locally. The process of institutionalization of this new type of wine a State level remains absent from its work, which focuses mainly in the local- economic - strategies of the actors (FRANCOIS, 2011). Political science then provides a useful resource to understand how interests locally built become at stake for public policy, and are then institutionalized by the State.

Thus, scholars in political sciences, accustomed to the analysis of the representation of interest groups and institutions, have tried to explain the process by which wine economic interests built locally were institutionalized in public policies nationally. According to them, wine industry locally gathers several types of organized actors, carrying sectorial visions in conflict (JULIEN, SMITH, 2008; SMITH, OF MAILLARD, COSTA, 2007). Their disagreements end up with compromises obtained by a “political work” - operation by which the actors define a specific vision of the market of the wine, its problems, of its challenges, of its general organization - in local arenas of representation, which take then in charge of defining with the State the wine statutory rules. All in all, the regulations of the wine market are based on a “political work”, and what vision arises from it. Its enforcement relies on a close cooperation between corporatists groups – such as unions - and the State. Indeed, when the State endorses it and gives it a regulatory form, it is expected in return that the groups of representatives ensure its enforcement locally (SMITH, OF MAILLARD, COSTA, 2007).10. Although interesting, the approach is nevertheless criticized, in particular because of the very great role it grants to the corporatists fights (FRANCOIS, 2011). The major reproach carried against the authors is then to neglect the economic aspects, while implying that wine industry is determined by politics, and only politics. While paying attention on this dimension, their approach relates more to the macro level - the institutionalization of the wine regulations - than to the micro level - economic local strategies of production.

How useful are these academic research for this presentation? It seems that they can complement each other. One clarifies, on the one side, the micro dimension, the other highlights, on the other, the macro level. Both are important and a connection between the two remains to be done. A connected theoretical framework can then be suggested. At the local level, economic actors are imbricated in a wine market historically structured by conflicts, resulting in the domination of a market design specific to one type of production, a “conception of control”. In this context, the actors adopt at least two strategies: to imitate standards defined by the historical leaders, “incumbent” actors (FLUSSTEIN, ) - for example, by producing D.O. “vins de châteaux” wine under I.O. B.M. (REHOT, 2007) - or to adopt innovative strategies - trying for example to impose new standards of presentation, of production such as the “garage wines” (CHAUVIN, 2004), then regarded as a deviant minority by the leaders - The emergence of varietal wines in Languedoc-Roussillon fit in the second case. Being a foreign wine concept – “varietal wine” originates from countries of the New-World -, the crux of the problem is then of understanding how such a wine concept managed to become a foreign country - the institutionalization of the wine regulations - than to the micro level - economic local strategies of production.

As it comes to the development of our presentation, we will see in the first part that the local appearance of varietal wines was impossible before the Seventies, because the local “conception of control” set by professionals and the State around “table wines” – a specific type of wine, different to the D.O. wines – was “locking” major alternative wine market conceptions. Professionals, scientists and politicians were induced to block alternative to emerge. From the Seventies on, European and State incentives initiated massive structural renewal of wine types in Languedoc-Roussillon leading to the contestation of older modes of production by theses actors, and the constitution of “Local Wines” (LW) as a competitive wine market, and varietal wines was, without a doubt, no exception to that. The process by which it came to exist was nothing natural, nor an “obvious” selection among several alternatives. It resulted from a collective work - in a way due to lobbying - of construction of a wine market conception competing with others, which managed to succeed at last with the recognition of the State (ROGER, 2010; JACQUET, 2004). In this sense, it is not false to allot the appearance of the varietal wines to some individuals (ATRIN, 1994), to their economic strategies to introduce varietal wines on the international wine markets (GARCIA-PARPET, 2004), but these explanations could not be sufficient. Actors alone cannot impose new mode of production. At the local level, inter-firm relationships must be strong, stabilized around a common vision, shared in a collective organization. Gathering economic actors around a common goal is feasible though a “political work” (SMITH, OF MAILLARD, COSTA, 2007). I.e. a collective transformation of their perception – cognitive framing – of what a wine market is – its problems, goals, strategies –. Thus, they develop a specific vision of what a wine market for varietal wines should be, and try to impose their conception to their adversaries. Thus, another major factor ought to be taken into consideration: the role of the State. In fact, the State plays a central part in the existence of a product since it defines the rules of production, marketing, competition and stability of the exchanges between the firms of the sector (FLUSSTEIN, 1996; 2001; SMITH, OF MAILLARD, COSTA, 2007). It contributes to define essential market conditions for the success of a product, such as varietal wines. In fact, the State plays central role in the existence of product since it defines the rules of production, marketing, competition and stability of the exchanges between the firms of the sector (FLUSSTEIN, 1996; 2001). It contributes to define essential market conditions for the success of this product. Defining with the State the regulations of a wine market empowers its founders to lead it sustainably. The emergence of a market is explained by the meeting of organized local actors and government officials who recognize the validity of the design of the first. Micro The aim of this presentation is then to connect both macro dimensions by showing how the current success of the Languedoc-Roussillon varietals edge Be explained by the ability of certain wine firms to build local strategies, diffuses locally and construct with the State has set of specific regulations.

One more comprehension key can be given, to explain the institutionalization on local interests. According to Fouilleux, public policy remain (FOUILLEUX, 2003) unchanged until a range of actors in contact with – here vine and wine - public policy - professionals, scientists, politicians – come to change their comportments - the same public policies. When they do so, regulations are put in a reconsideration of the dominant wine conception by different actors allowed others to structure new local economic interests around “varietal wines”.

I / A restructuring of Languedoc-Roussillon’s wine interests, and their restructuring around quality and varietals:

Local historical conflicts from the past shaped the productive environment of Languedoc-Roussillon. The local “conception of control” set by professionals and the State around Table Wine (TW) was “locking” major alternative wine market conceptions (1). As Europe and the State induced programs to subsidize structural changes – renewal of types of vines, economic concentration of local actors –, it contributed to discredit the older TW mode of production. Criticisms emerged against its economic model and paved the way to new wine market conceptions (2).

1 - Local interests dominated by the production of TW :

On a local scale, relations to the State, local organization, their economic relationships, hierarchies, were structured by a dominant standard of production and market, known as TW – a specific category of

10 Each wine market – for instance the D.O. wine market - is controlled by a dominant political design of it, simultaneously shared by the State and the professional organizations, working hand in hand to enforce regulations.
wine, different to the D.O. wines – (a). Its effects extended the winegrowers. Actors whose professional career was closely linked with winegrowers, such as scientists, were then induced to promote old, local modes of production (b). Similarly, politicians, because they were in close contact with the main winegrower’s local organization – also potential voters, defined within the Parliament the interests – i.e. TW - of local dominants organizations (c). Overall, the combined support of theses 3 types of actors let TW locally undisputed.

- Local professional interests blocking the emergence of alternative productive conception:

In Languedoc-Roussillon, the dominant mode of production was for long TW, a cheap wine with low production constraints, designed for the national market, which was at that time protected from wine importations. This productive specificity, unique in France, was inherited from the last quarter of the 20th century, when wine inner demand was high. Professional obtained in 1935 from the State a financial support to resist overproduction crises and face price devaluation – called the “Wine Statute” -. The economic strategies of the local actors were then strongly oriented towards this kind of production, which benefited from governmental subsidies in the event of crisis. The major union - the General Confederation of Mid’l’s Winemakers (CGVM) – main defender of this vision and standard of production, was dominating the local professional field, constituting a rampart to any contestation of the TW economic model, based on the sharing of State subsidies, and so, letting no possibility for the region economic independence. In spite of successive overproduction crises, no contestation of this mode of production emerged, while, at the same time, consumption of TW was dwindling slowly. The more the consumption was falling and overproduction happening, the more local organizations were hanging on to the Wine Statute. To understand it, it is also necessary to seize the structuring effects of the professional field beyond its borders. Indeed, it echoed particularly within the scientific field, which remained also very restive with the change of the wine types of production.

- Scientific interests centered on TW mode of production:

The structuring of the professional field diffused to the wine scientific field. Indeed, the wine scientific agents evolved in research centers imbricated in the Languedoc territory, which, as we evoked concerning the professional field, had productive characteristics oriented to the production of TW. The wine scientific actors were not autonomous, they were not, in any case, separated from their territorial environment. Their careers, their objects of research, were strongly related to the local productive specificities. Scientists showed great attachment to the local modes of culture. For instance, the main types of vines – then Carignan and Aramon – were widespread, while varieties planted in the region of Bordeaux – such as the Merlot – or in California - such as Syrah – were considered of no use, as regards to the productive needs of TW economic conception. Locally, this cultural pattern led the scientific actors to orientate their research and career objectives according to the legitimate productive needs. Example: Jean Branas, professor emeritus of the École Nationale Supérieure of Agronomy of Montpellier (ENSA), and his close team of colleagues, defended TW, refused foreign types of vines, as they were convinced that Languedoc-Roussillon’s specialization would make it the worldwide supplier of TW. (Source: Review "agricultural and wine progress", Years 1970-1983). The scientific field was not the only one to evolve narrowly with the professional field. The political representatives also took part in the Languedoc Roussillon’s conservatism.

- A conservative political representation:

In order to defend the local wine interests, the recourse to elected officials was central in the negotiations with the State. It was all the more comprehensible that the dominant trade unions such as the CGVM were poorly inserted in other agricultural and wine national structures. Therefore, local politicians constituted as a network, which was all the more developed, that the local trade unions were remote from national institutions. Survival of these politicians was due to their capacity to consolidate the dominant wine representation, which attracted them in return electoral support. This model constituted during all first half of the 20th century the prototype of the wine political representation. This mutual support structured rules of the political game political. (DÉDIEU, 1998)

Transition: In spite of successive crises, the Languedoc-Roussillon’s wine market for TW remained stable, because its principles were undisputed. The objectives of it, i.e. a standardized, mass production was orientating “interpretations of the collective and public problems” (SMITH, OF MAILLARD, COSTA, 2007; 29) of multiple type of actors. During the following period however, the stability of the TW market was compromised: the “conception of control” it rested on appeared less and less legitimate. A period of contestation opened, out of which the varietal wines appeared, under the joint action of winegrowers, wine traders and cooperatives to operate a new economic and production conception of control.

- A destabilization of local balances consecutive to the emergence of Europe and the State:

The Seventies were a turning point in the southernmost wine growing area, which gradually experienced a reversal of its wine market conception. As the State set up financed programs to reorganize of the vineyard, it triggered pre-established local power balances (a). Local scientists were associated to develop quality and cultivation techniques, contributing directly to the intensification of the use of new varieties by the professionals (b). Such an open door allowed marginal actors and reformists to find a sound box for contestation and developing wines of different quality. A handful of actors defended alternative economic conceptions of Languedoc-Roussillon’s wine, among which “Local Wines” (TW), a category - different from D.O. and T.W.-offering moderate production constraints, limited competition between professional organization, and as so, a space for developing a new “conception of control”, used as an embryo of market for varietal wines (c).

- An incentive to economic concentration and renewal of varieties of wines:

In 1973, a program of reorganization, named “Chirac Plan” was set up in order to adapt the Languedoc-Roussillon’s wine production to European Common Market Organization (CMO) objectives. It introduced “strategic plans of reorganization of the vineyard” which created small “pockets” for which recommendations to plant new varietals were made. Their selection was entrusted to the National Interprofessional Office for Table Wine (ONIVIT), to scientific institutions (AgroParisTech, National Research Institute INRA, and the Technical Institute for Vine and Wine (ITV)). The interprofessional office, composed of winegrowers as well as wine merchants, piloted new plantation oriented to the “market needs”. Winegrowers were granted subsidies on condition of grubbing out traditional varietals, and merging their firms. It resulted in economic concentration, as well as a profound renewal of local varieties of wine. Plantation of “international” types of vine (Syrah, Merlot, Sauvignon Cabernet, Chardonnay) were then introduced.

- Scientific interest growing for varietal improvement and mechanization

A generational change took place within the Superior National School for Agronomy of Montpellier (ENSAM), followed by a radical change of conceptions about wine. Denis Boubals, the successor of Jean Branas, an admirer of California’s vineyards, initiated technical exchanges with the University of Davis. A partnership took place to carry experiments on harvesting techniques and mechanization. Symposiums on the mechanization of the grape harvest were organized annually in Montpellier. New techniques were jointly developed, especially adapted to harvesting and pruning of Syrah. Languedoc-Roussillon became the world’s leading exporter of wine machines. Emulation grew within the scientific field for new type of vines and of their culture. (Source: review "agricultural and wine progress", years 1980-1987)

- A change in the conception of wine quality pushing forward promoters of new varietal wines:

As improvement of wine quality was set by the State as a primary goal, the idea of mass production was oriented by scientists, became highly criticized. Harsh disputes arose to impose alternative conceptions. Within the Departmental Confederations of Young Farmers (CDJA), a new generation of winegrowers developed new ideas: Jean Clavel, secretary of the Aude unit, president of the Trade union of Coteaux du Languedoc, as well as Jacques Gravegeal, president of the Herault unit, were two prominent characters. The first initiated the production of D.O. wines locally. The second, who also considered TW was inevitably on the wane, took another path. He found room in a third category of wine – Local Wine (LW), which offers a great flexibility.
in the rules of production, and little professional competition – for developing his own conception of wine production. He pleaded for adapting wine production to market needs by bringing together local winegrowers, cooperatives and wine merchants, in close contact with large and medium-sized retail business. Contracts were set up to ensure buyers and producers relations. Quantities, quality, price for different varieties of wines were decided each year in advance. As so, partnerships could be adapted rapidly to the evolution of with large and medium-sized retail business. Core members – producers (the president of the private cellars of Herault, Jean-Claude Tastavy), wine merchants, Jacques Bourbounouss, affiliated with the retail business (Chais-Beaucaire-Casino), and cooperatives (Cellar of Limoux, Field Saint-Hilaire, Field of Bosc, Farmhouse of Daumas-Gassac) were convinced to turn their back to TW and switch to LW, which type of wine allows the use of traditional local types of wines and new varietals. (Source: interview with Jean Clavel, founder of DO wines in Aude, and Jacques Berthomeau, operations manager within the Ministry for agriculture).

Transition: However TW gradually was coming unfit to demand, the strength of it relied on a common “cognitive framing” – a common comprehension of what wine production must be -, inducing a complex set of interests between professionals, scientists and politicians. The interference of the State came to interfere with these local orders and triggered the equilibrium between them. As subsidies were granted on condition of renewing varieties of wines, the local cognitive framing changed – quality becoming the main motto -, and scientists became more involved in changing modes of production. Innovative wine growers, among whom the promoters of the LW, benefited from this general change to set different interprofessional relations with producers, cooperatives and wines merchants, in order to swiftly adapt to wine merchants’ needs. This local evolution was necessary, however not sufficient to the appearance of “varietal wines”. The development of interests corresponding to the modernizing objectives of the State made it possible then for innovative actors to reach gradually the institutions in bond with the Ministry for agriculture (ONIVINS, Chamber of agriculture, FDSEA, FNSEA). Gradually, the interests locally made up around the type of wines varietal were transformed to become policy issues seized by the State.

II/ A framing of local interests on varietal wines allowing their institutionalization:

By the time LW mode of production was widely spreading locally, its main representatives came to occupy various positions in institutions or organizations in closer contact with the State. However, their lack of common discipline locally came to hinder their efforts at a national level (1). An effort was then gradually done to convert local interests in terms adequate to ministerial objectives in the forthcoming new market: setting up a regional wine image, and an interprofession that could enforce national regulations at a local level (2).

1 – An institutionalization of interests triggered by local organization, unable to set clear regulations for its own market:

LW actors were inherently attracted to institutions sharing the same conceptions of wine market they did. They did find partners in general agriculture unions, who had earlier developed contact with the State on the same terms. This quickly gave them access to key positions in contact with the State (a). In spite of the growing success of LW among local actors, former organizational habits came back, and prevented from framing a stable market (b).

d- A switch in transmission channels, and access to State officers:

As LW actors refused to join TW or DO actors, they invested other transmission channels that allowed them to gains access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Locally first, connections were tied between LW key actors and a set of departmental institutions, which had served historically as transmission canals between the State and local organizations. Jacques Gravageal, a prominent figure of the revival of LW, gained access to a set of institutions, thanks to his newly acquired legitimacy. He, who had set a partnership with Jacques Bourbounouss - member of the powerful Departmental federation of the Trade unions of Farmers (FDSEA) – gained access to the FDSEA, as vice-president with Jean-Claude Bouquet. This entity, which was very powerful in the agricultural domain since the European agriculture CAP first agreement – had never been entrusted wine Languedoc winegrowers, traditionally resisting against Europe. This newly acquired legitimacy gives him quick access to the Chamber of Agriculture of the Herault, of which he becomes president in 1984. Locally, this institution voted budgets, directed the departmental priorities, and distributed the financings. European budgets were directed at develop techniques of pruning for new varietals, particularly adapted to the culture of Syrah. Also, he was appointed at the departmental interprofessional office of wines (ONIVINS). These 3 positions were then decisive. Both constituted a passby to access the National federation of the Trade unions of Farmers (FNSEA), in direct link with the Ministry, and the national TW comity in the national bureau of ONIVINS, which he accessed to in 1984, by ministerial decree.

b- A local organization unable to frame its own market:

Existing rules for LW production was far less constraining than other wines, but appeared also soon unfit to maintain cohesion between actors. The selection of grapes was done on a local level by professional bodies. They quickly multiplied, offering unsteady, various levels of quality. Then, there was no general economic organization, which would make it possible to bring safety of prices. In addition, there existed an atomization of the denominations, which scrambles the offer. These three elements prevent the construction of a regional image for LW, and as so, its legitimacy toward the Ministry. (Source : Jacques Gravageal, co-founder of Vins de Pays d’ Oc)

Transition: However they acquired unprecedented positions in institutions, LW representatives had difficulties with their basis. Lack of organization scrambled the image of LW wine, and halted further institutionalization of local interests at a national level. What was needed was the unification of professionals, and rules for selection of grapes in order to grant a common label of quality to the Ministry.

2 - The regional construction of a brand:

Locally, a new conception for wine production had emerged, but its organization remained partly framed by former organization tradition. The influence of international wine merchants was then decisive in focusing attention to varietal wines (a) and the building of a regional image. Unification of organizations from various departments was another mean of building a unified image for the region and stop the inflation of denominations (b). The control of global quality came to a mean to set a common standard to rule the market (b).

d- A regional brand building in contact with international wine merchants:

LW main actors were thinking of constituting a common brand to grant the region with an image, such as Bordeaux or Burgundy, but the main asset to constructing it came from a connection with an international wine merchant. Robert Skalli, landowner of a vineyard in California, and wine merchant in Europe. This newly acquired legitimacy gives him quick access to the Chamber of Agriculture of the Herault, of which he becomes president in 1984. Locally, this institution voted budgets, directed the departmental priorities, and distributed the financings. European budgets were directed at develop techniques of pruning for new varietals, particularly adapted to the culture of Syrah. Also, he was appointed at the departmental interprofessional office of wines (ONIVINS). These 3 positions were then decisive. Both constituted a passby to access the National federation of the Trade unions of Farmers (FNSEA), in direct link with the Ministry, and the national TW comity in the national bureau of ONIVINS, which he accessed to in 1984, by ministerial decree.

e- Construction of a single inter-profession as a partner for the State:

Concentration was necessary both to rule locally – with a simplified interprofession - and offer the State a single partner. The FDSEA of Herault and the FDSEA of the close departments were used to build a regulation framework of a LW common to the 4 departments. This regulation framework proposed in addition the creation of an inter-profession. The interprofessional Union of the local wines of Oc – Le Syndicat des Vins de Pays d’ Oc – already came out, which brought together producers and traders, a place for the brokers and the producer groups. Jacques Gravageal was elected president.

c- Offering unified criteria of production:
As another mean to meet the recognition of the Ministry and improve their image, varietal wine advocates had to allow new general terms of production and approval. They reinforced the criteria of production (the planting of varieties, degree, analytical criteria), for a better qualitative adaptation of the wines to consumption, and in a way complementary to D.O of the area. Also, they set new approval rules for wines claiming the denomination "Vin de Pays d'Oc" in a rigorous way, by transferring the operations of test sample selection (which would be now computerized) under the triple administrative authority of the ONIVINS, the Interprofessional Union of the Pays d'oc of the Country of Oc, and to the Pulpit of enology of the Faculty of Pharmacy of Montpellier.

Conclusion:
In October 1987, a decree proposed by the ONIVINS from Jacques Gravegeal and Robert Skalli's representatives was signed by the Minister of Agriculture. It offered its recognition both to the "Vins de Pays d'Oc", constituted as a brand with its own rules of production, and to the interprofession built locally.

The appearance of the varietal wines in the South of France was, as for the DO wines in Bordeaux or Burgundy, the result of a collective work to build a new wine market conception, in close contact with the State. However, controversies in Bordeaux between modes of production had not been triggered by the intervention of the State. Explanation to that lies in the fact that few State regulations existed at that time in Bordeaux, when much of the regulations were set on a local level, until it came to fraud.

The emergence of varietal wines and their legitimacy resulted from a different matter in Languedoc-Roussillon, the destabilization of a wine market, which collective conception was unfit to the contextual evolution of demand. Thus, the market for varietal wines slowly emerged as a competitor to TW. We underlined that, when the TW market became unstable – because its main conception of control was disputed –, room opened for contestation outside of its traditional institutions. A new conception of wine production could then be developed and legitimized where allies were met outside of it. Organizations sharing close conceptions in agriculture (such as the FDSEA and FNSEA) were allies in bringing wine production could then be developed and legitimized where allies were met outside of it. Organizations sharing close conceptions in agriculture (such as the FDSEA and FNSEA) were allies in bringing legitimacy to the LW promoters and space for accessing departmental, then State authorities. As they gained position at a departmental level, LW could benefit from scientists' interest for developing new varietals and State subsidies to renew their vines. As quality became a common goal, a handful of actors started to develop an alternative conception to the former, dominant one. However, the constitution of local interests around new varietals and adaptation to market needs did not provide them straight recognition from the State. As for Bordeaux, a clear-cut position on rules of production, product selection, and organization unity, to be granted the right to self-organize the market.

We have then showed that the appearance of the varietal wines in Languedoc-Roussillon rested on a process of legitimization on several scales, far from being restricted only to decisional institutions. It gained legitimacy with the support of multiple actors, whether professionals, scientists, officials, who attributed to it a new value in order to reverse the former, dominant conception of TW, contributing to create around varietal wines an implicit agreement.

Sources:

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