




# PALERMO 2010



## **Competitiveness of terroir models on global market of wines: the case of sparkling wines**

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Today wine markets are global markets: competition rules their global area. Nevertheless wines are produced on territories and with varying degrees of relation to them. It is usual to distinguish old terroir models and new cluster models. Models based on terroir and protected designation of origin face models based on cluster organisation, type of vine and brands.

The aim of the paper is considering the present situation of terroir models and the changes occurring in their working when they are attacked by the new models of new producers (United States, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa ...). We are peculiarly interested in the markets of white sparkling wines.

The theoretical framework is given by an evolutionary model defined in Barrère (2003, 2007). A wine market is modelled as a strategic game between mutually dependant players the issue of which gives a well-defined level of quality. That leads to diverse dynamics and to specific path development dependences.

The model is used to interpret the history of some sparkling wines. On the one hand some terroir models get incredible successes (obviously the main case is the Champagne one), on the other hand some others have poor results (who, today, knows the Blanquette de Limoux which is the oldest sparkling wine in the world?). Moreover, at the beginning of their development, some terroir wines were in similar conditions but their paths to development have been very diverse.

Then the present situation of terroir models is not unique. The paper thus considers the different policies used to compete with the new producers (in particular the premium policies), their results in the evolution of market segmentation and their consequences on the cohesion of regional wine areas.

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