The Langhe, an Italian region, not differently from other beautiful vineyards landscapes, has experienced a process of rapid economic growth and capital accumulation as a result of success in the wine market. However, whilst wine producers elsewhere have achieved this target by guaranteeing only individual trademarks, Langhe has used a “mixed strategy”, which combines both individual and collective property rights on the same product. Compared to purely collective property regimes, this system introduces a certain level of individualization, which allows individual producers to internalize externalities due to overuse and underinvestment problems and benefit from both the individualistic and the collective economic logics.

This research uses legal and economic tools, coupled with institutional theory, to analyze how the assignment of collective property rights in wine appellations to local producers contributed to the success of the Langhe, an Italian wine-growing region. The analysis will begin by attempting to provide an overview of the appellation system, taking as case study the Langhe, an Italian region (Chapter I). The investigation next turns to the analysis of the economics for the assignment of trademarks in the wine market (Chapter II). It then analyzes what the advantages and the costs are of collective marks compared to individual ones (Chapter III). In conclusion (chapter IV), the case study of wine appellations in the Langhe will provide empirical evidence of the theoretical efficiency of collective property regimes on marks in a context where members may freely exit and entrance is not restricted based on monopolistic concerns.